It is, for example, inconceivable that the Briton or American who lacks cOlisiderable personal experience of the Orient 'can fully appreciate the magnitude of those Cairo plans, or their strategical and political ' significance. Korea-what is that? Surely no more than a little, jutting peninsula somewhere off the coast of China. What are the Pacific island possessions of Japan 'but a splattering of insignificant atolls north of Australia? Some detailed elucidation may accordingly be valuable.
No attempt shall be made to deal with Manchuria and other Japanese conquests on the Asiatic mainland proper, or with those te~ritories from Hong Kong to Burma and the Philippines to Sumatra which our enemy has won for himself during this war. They have been discussed frequently, enough, and their politico-strategic significance is, to a certain extent, understood. Consider, however, the mandated islands of the central Pacific, whose occupation by the enemy dates from the last war.
They consist of four groups: the Carolines and Marshalls, the Palaus and Marianas (or Laarones), which comprise in all some fourteen hundred islands. Most conveniently for strategic purposes, they lie within a basin between Japan in the north, New Guinea in the south, the Philippines in the west, and various British and American groups in the east. The Japanese had to travel some 1)200 miles to reach them, the Australians 1,800 miles, the Philippinos 590 miles, and the Americans from Hawaii 2,000 miles. Such facts reveal the positive military value in this region of an archipelago which was originally explored and developed by the Spanish and British, sold to Germany last century, then placed in the care of Japan as mandated territories under the League of Nations after the Pacific enemy , had occupied them as our ally during the last war.
The total land area of the islands is only 1,500 square miles, so that they cover little more than one square mile apiece, though the average is made up of many sti1l smaller dots and a few reallyflarge ones. With the exception of Ponape, a big island with thick vegetation and some remarkable prehistoric ruins, they comprise an uninteresting and often sterile archipelago. They produce some tropical crops) and phosphates are found ' at , Angaur in the Palaus, but 'nobody would fight to retain them on intrinsic, economic grounds. It took the Japanese to convince ' the world that they had another value. First, demonstrated the Japanese, the tangled variety and 11 urn ber of the ,islands makes them peculiarly suitable' for secret air-naval bases. Second, ' the position of these groups, plumb in the centre of the 'Pacific basin, enables such bases to be used for the air-naval control of all the waters and skies from Japan to New Guinea and from the Philippines to the Gilberts. Thus' the enemy established his most important base within the atoll of Truk (a great coral reef enclosing a lagoon with small islands within) which is situated 'almost at. the dead centre of all the groups.
Truk has developed anchorages and facilities for the accommodation of an ent~re navy if necessary, and it is believed that a large part of the' Japanese navy was based at Truk until we moved too close for its comfort. The atoll has been transformed, against all the rules of the League Mandates Commission, and considerably to the astonishment of innocent American and British politicians, into a veritable Portsmouth of the South Seas. Geographical epicentre of most of the great typhoons ill this part of the Pacific, though nearly always calm itself, Truk was' pivot of all military operations in these islands. It was eventually by-passed without immediate capture by the American forces. .
It was thought at first that these forces would need to advance doggedly across the Pacific from island stronghold to stronghold, from the Mars~alls in the east-with big battles at Jaluit and Mili-then attack northwards from New Guinea via the solitary but convenient (if heavily fortified) atoll of Kapingamarangi or Greenwich Island. And it was considered that after a bloody fight for, Truk it would be necessary to master successive garrisons , on the many islands of the Palaus, stretching towards the Philippines, before startil;g'to reduce the strong Marianas-and the big bases at Saipan and Tinian-which would at last lead northwards ' towards Japan. ' Actually our allies, with bold if not revolutionary strategy, made for the Marianas direct, leaving innumerable Japanese strongpoints in the south to be mopped-up at leisure. They were able to do thi' s because the Japanese air-naval power had been so reduced that it could no longer be committed irrevoc~bly south of Japanese home waters. The 'strategic value of the islands was not diminished thereby: and, if the en tire archipelago is fortified and garrisoned ' in American and, British hands (the term British covering Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand), an effective scheme of Pacific control can be based thereon.
Long before the present war Japan considered that the retention and military development of the Pacific "mandates" was essential to her security, but also found it essential to fortify certain other overseas territories, among which Korea and Formosa were outstandingly conspicuous. The map shows how Korea guards the southern entrance to the Sea of Japan, and how Formosa, with adjoining islands, stands sentinel just at that point where the trans-oceanic routes reach the sea zone of Japan proper. Both, in their way, are essential Gibraltars to a Japanese Empire, and as such they were acquired.
Korea (or Chosen) admittedly descends as a rugged peninsula of even width from Manchuria, and its inhabitants closely resemble the Chinese. For centuries till 1910, however, it was an independent nation, suffering the vicissitudes of, say, a Poland, but retaining throughout its own aspirations, customs, and monarchy. Chinese, Tartars, Japanese had at various titnes occupied the country and exacted tribute, but Korea was a distinct member of the family of nations till Japan acquired overwhelming power in the locality from successful wars with China and Russia. Then the "Hermit Kingdom/' always unwarlike and materially backward, accepted the suzerainty of the most unpleasant of her neighbours.
The Japanese immediately set to work with their ant-like energy to develop Korea into a Gibraltar indeed. But they had more than a· rock here. The country itself is twice as big as Portugal, wit:h thrice the population. In configuration it more nearly resembles Scotland, being about the same width though nearly twice the length. "As plentifully sprinkled with mountains as a ploughed field with ridges," Korea lies in such a position that it can be regarded either as a dagger pointing at southern Japan or as a highway from Japan .to the heart 9f northern China.
The Japanese proclaimed, perhaps rightly in terms of power politics, that the control of Korea was as essential to their securlty as was the control of the Channel ports in time of war to Britain, or of Finland to Russia. But they were not content to hold the "Hermit Kingdom" as a bulwark. After developing the excellent harbours of Gensan on the east, Masampo 011 the south,. and Mokpo, Chemulpo, and Chinampo on the west coasts, they built railways to link those towns with the c~pital, Seoul, and proceeded at the earliest opportunity to use Korea as a means of swift military access to Manchuria. . Meanwhile the chief industries of cotton and sericulture, agriculture and the production of salt were goaded into prosperity, and Japanese mining engineers found and developed mineral dep· osits about which we still know little. Meanwhile . also, however, neither blandishments nor oppression would alter the resolution of the outwardly soft Korean people; and today, among all the territories controlled by Japan, this is probably the only one which can boast a population aching communally for independence in a manner analogous to that of the conquered European countries. Thus it can be understood why the Cairo Confere~ce promised independence to Korea-as the gift to which it was entitled, and as an excellent means not only of retaining close control over nearby Japan but also of main taining a buffer between those volcanic isles and China.
Before that happy state of affairs is brought to pass, it will be necessary for allied armies to clear China and Manchuria, and 'to secure air-naval control of the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan-also to fight another Italian campaign in a very similar country down a continuous backbone of easily defensible mountain barriers.
Korea may accordingly come last on the Pacific programme, as against a Formosa (Taiwan) .which might well be an early objective of an expedition from the Philippines.
Formosa is an island as big as ten Trinidads with a population of backward aboriginals twice that of New Zealand. It was an integral part of , China till 1895 when taken by the Japanese as a trophy of the Sino-Japanese War, so it must be returned to China even though the native inhabitants are n,ot Chinese and the old China did not bother to develop the island. All such work has been done by the Japanese, who have built a railway from the northern port, Keelung, via the considerable town, Taihoku, to the capital, Tainan, and the port of Takao in the south-west. Nearly 5,000 miles of. roads have heen built, and industries characteristically deve1oped~ chiefly salt, tobacco, tea, rice,', sugar, and mining.
But once again all this has been done with a sin ister purpose, and it is as Japan's fortl'ess-Outridet across the shipping routes leading to China that Formosa must be conquered and maintained in Chinese hands. The island is mountainous and afforested, but contains alluvial plains in the north and south which would be the obvious target for invading forces, and which doubtless contain several good airfields from which Japan, only 800 miles away) could be bombed on the Berlin scale.
First, simultaneously, or afterwards, the liberators would take the Pescadores, also promised to China at Cairo. They ~re a group of forty-eight small islands' between Formosa and tlie mainland, with a total population of no more than 60~OOO backward peasants and fishermen who are much harassed by the typhoons on whose exact track they unfortunately dwell. The Pescadores would obviously be of no importance but for their situation, which makes them a perfect stepping-stone, as well as a means of controlling'the straits, between China and Formosa. They also form the first link in a chain which runs from China via ' Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands to Japan itself. They would play an 'important part in an invasion 'of Japan from the south.
It can now be seen how, once these territories are reduced and garrisoned ,by the forces of democracy, Japan will be as helpless as a Britain deprived of Gibraltar, Malta, the Suez Canal, Ireland, and control of the Channel ports. It may also be seen, however, that much will depend upon the way we develop Japan's lost bastions afterwards, and on how we fit them into a. bold and statesmanlike scheme for the control and policing of the entire Pacific area. Moreover, it may be appreciated from the descriptions given that these territories are something more than distant marks on the .map, and the consummation of our strategy will not be attained without much sacrifice and lengthy fighting.
